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STATE OF UTAH 
JERALD WIXOM GREAVES, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 





RESTATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant adopts his prior statement of the facts 
with the following additions. 
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 75, both parties timely 
filed their respective briefs with the Utah Supreme Court. 
However, Points III and IV of respondent's brief con-
tained new material which was not considered by the trial 
court and/or was stricken from the trial court record. In 
point III, respondent alleged that he may suffer a possi-
ble denial of the right to travel, equal protection, and 
due process of law. In Point IV, respondent contended 
that he may lose his driving privileges if Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-2-18 (a) (3) (Supp. 1973), were invoked against him. 
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The lower court's memorandum decision of February 
26, 1974, held that Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.2 (Supp. 
1973), was unconstitutional for vagueness (R. 21-22). The 
final order approved by the trial court on March 19, 1974, 
also indicated that the statute in question was unconsti-
tutional for vagueness (R. 30). A prior order drafted by 
respondent for the Judge's signature contended that Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44.2, supra, was unconstitutional because 
it could deprive the respondent of due process and his 
right to travel (R. 26). This order was subsequently 
stricken from the trial court record by the Judge (R. 29). 
The lower court determined that the constitutional argu-
ments expressed in the order prepared by respondent 
were inconsistent with those expressed by the Court in 
its memorandum decision (R. 28). Thereafter, respon-
dent attempted to strike the court's final order and re-
instate his prior order (R. 32-33). 
The Honorable Venoy Christofferson reaffirmed the 
court's position by denying the respondent's motion to 
strike order simultaneously rejecting respondent's argu-
ments concerning right to travel, equal protection and 
due process of law. 
Respondent and appellant agree, as evidenced by 
statements which appear in their respective briefs, that 
"InJo ruling was issued regarding the constitutionality of 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-18, supra." The aforementioned 
statute is concerned with driver's license revocation which 
is not under consideration in this case. The only statute 
reviewed for constitutionality in this case is Utah Code 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Ann. § 41-6-44.2, supra, which does not address the sub-
ject of driver's license revocation. 
Points III and IV of respondent's brief contained 
new material which was stricken from the trial court rec-
ord, but argued by the respondent in his brief. It is 
therefore necessary for the appellant to file a reply brief 
and answer the new matter set forth in respondent's brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE SUPREME COURT CANNOT LOOK 
BEYOND THE TRIAL COURT'S MEMOR-
ANDUM DECISION AND FINAL ORDER 
ON APPEAL AND CONSIDER ARGUMENTS 
STATED IN RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, BUT 
STRICKEN FROM THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINAL ORDER. 
In Points III and IV of respondent's brief, he has 
argued issues which were specifically stricken from the 
trial court record for their nonconformance with the trial 
court's memorandum decision (R. 29). It is appellant's 
contention that the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
should not consider such issues argued in respondent's 
brief which are absent from the official record. See 
Cooper v. Foresters Underwriters, 123 Utah 215, 257 P. 
2d 540 (1953). 
The procedural facts of the instant case indicate that 
the Honorable Venoy Christofferson handed down a 
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memorandum decision concerning the merits of this de-
claratory judgment action in response to appellant's mo-
tion to dismiss (R. 21, 22) on February 26, 1974. Re-
spondent prepared an order (R. 26) for Judge Christof-
ferson's signature which was supposed to be in conform-
ance with the judge's memorandum decision. On March 
19, 1974, Judge Christofferson realized that the order 
drafted by respondent's counsel was not in conformance 
with his memorandum decision of February 26, 1974, and 
ordered it stricken (R. 29). The court then approved and 
signed a substitute final order (R. 30) which accurately 
expressed the basis of the court's decision. Thereafter, 
respondent filed a motion to strike (R. 35) the substitute 
final order issued by the court on March 21, 1974. Re-
spondent's motion was denied on March 28, 1974 (R. 
35) by Judge Christofferson and the substitute final or-
der (R. 30) was simultaneously reaffirmed. 
The Utah case law of Wasatch Oil Refining Co. v. 
Wade, 92 Utah 50, 63 P. 2d 1070 (1936), and Miller v. 
Marks, 46 Utah 257, 148 P. 412 (1951), holds that the 
Utah State Supreme Court will look to the court's final 
order rather some qualified, limited, or stricken prelimin-
ary opinion of the court in the Supreme Court's effort to 
ascertain what the court based its decision upon. The 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah in Bradley v. Lewis, 
78 Utah 307, 3 P. 2d 253 (1939), held as Mows: 
"It is well established law that the appellate 
court is bound by the record as certified and may 
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consider only the record as certified and trans-
mitted to it." Id. at 339. 
See also Murphy Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Skaggs 67 
Utah 487, 248 Pac. 127 (1926); and Reliable Furniture 
Company v. Fidelity and Guaranty Ins. Under., Inc., 14 
Utah 2d 169, 380 P. 2d 135 (1963). In the more recent 
Corbet v. Corbet, 24 Utah 2d 378, 472 P. 2d 430 (1970), 
this Court similarly held as follows: 
"On appeal to this court we review the judg-
ments and orders appealed from on the basis of 
the record upon which the trial court acted." Id. 
at 433. 
The issues that respondent raises in Points III and IV 
of his brief were clearly stricken (R. 29) from the record 
by the lower court and are therefore not appropriate 
subjects for review by the Utah State Supreme Court as 
indicated by the prior case law. 
Chief Justice Joseph E. Frick expressed the court's 
policy not to review issues that have been stricken or 
omitted from the trial court in the case of VanCott v. 
Wall, 53 Utah 282, 178 P. 42 (1919), as follows: 
"The duty that we owe to ourselves, as well as 
to other litigants, however, requires us to state 
that almost the entire argument contained in 
appellant's brief refers to matters wholly outside 
of the record on this appeal, and hence may not 
be considered by us for any purpose. The lay-
man is very apt to assume that as long as he deals 
with facts as he sees them it is immaterial in 
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what manner they are brought to the court's at-
tention. As he views it, courts are created to 
administer justice according to the facts, and if 
the facts are laid before them they should con-
sider them, regardless of how or when presented. 
We need not, nor shall be pause to, offer either 
argument or explanation why such a view cannot 
be entertained, much less enforced, by courts. 
Then again appellant overlooks the fact that 
this court, in cases like the one at bar, exercises 
appellate jurisdiction only, and its power of re-
view is strictly limited to the record presented 
on appeal. Although we had the inclination yet 
we were powerless to enter upon a consideration 
of any matter or fact which was not contained in 
the record as originally presented on this appeal." 
Id. at 48. 
The case law clearly indicates that the Utah State 
Supreme Court should act solely on the basis of the trial 
court record. Therefore, the issues previously stricken 
from the trial court record do not appear to be appropriate 
subjects for respondent's brief and should not be con-
sidered by this Court on this appeal. 
POINT II. 
RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO DEMON-
STRATE A POSSIBLE DENIAL OF THE 
RIGHT TO TRAVEL, EQUAL PROTECTION, 
OR DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
In the event that this Court deems that Points III 
and IV of respondent's brief are appropriate issues to be 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
considered on this appeal, it is the appellant's contention 
that respondent has failed to demonstrate a possible de-
nial of the right to travel, equal protection, or due process 
of law. 
Respondent asserts that Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.2 
(Supp. 1973), is vague when it is enforced through Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-21-18 (a) (3) (Supp. 1973), because "it 
works to deny the person charged the right to operate 
a motor vehicle without regard as to his ability to operate 
the vehicle." Respondent additionally asserts that the 
statute is vague in not specifying the basis upon which 
the denial of one's driver's license is made. 
Respondent's argument is without merit. By respon-
dent's own admission, he states that no ruling was issued 
by the lower court regarding the constitutionality of Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-2-18 (a) (3) (Supp. 1973). See page two 
of respondent's brief and page one of appellant's brief. 
The aforementioned statute was not relied upon by the 
trial court when it made its determination of vagueness. 
The respondent erroneously concludes that the lower 
court pivoted its decision on something other than what 
was stated by the court. The only statute considered by 
the lower court and presently under consideration by 
this court, is that of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.2, supra. 
The aforementioned statute contains no provisions which 
would deny a person the privilege of operating a motor 
vehicle. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.2, supra, embodies 
provisions which would allow the judiciary to imprison 
and/or fine the offender after he had been convicted in a 
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court of law. However, there is no language within the 
above statute that would allow a court to revoke an indi-
vidual's driver's license for violation of its provisions. 
It is clear that Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.2, supra, is 
not void for vagueness. Appellant has adequately re-
viwed this issue in Point IV of his brief. Further support 
of appellant's position is found in Synnott v. State, 515 
P. 2d 1154 (Okl. Cr. 1973). The defendant Synott con-
tended that the statutory elements, including the prohibi-
ted blood alcohol concentration, which were articulated 
in the state driving under the influence statute, were not 
sufficiently related to the conduct of the defendant and 
were so vague and uncertain that he was unable to pre-
pare a defense against them. The court, without extensive 
discussion, held that defendant's argument was frivolous: 
"This assertion is likewise without merit. 
We find no unconstitutional vagueness or am-
biguity in that statute." Id. at 1157. 
The Utah State Legislature did not need to specify 
the actual basis for enacting the measure or punishing 
the offender. Brim v. Jones, 11 Utah 200, 39 Pac. 825, 
affd, 165 U. S. 180 (1895), holds that "it is in the discre-
tion of the legislature to regulate the use of the high-
ways." The United States Supreme Court later defined 
the presumptions to be afforded to proper legislative 
subjects in South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barn-
well Bros., 303 U. S. 177, 58 S. Ct. 510, 82 L. Ed. 734, reh. 
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den., 303 U. S. 667, 58 S. Ct. 510, 82 L. Ed. 1124 (1938), 
as follows: 
"When the action of the legislature is within 
the scope of its power, fairly debatable questions 
as to its reasonableness, wisdom, and priority are 
not for the determination of courts, but for the 
legislative body, on which rests the duty and 
responsibility of decision . . . Being a legislative 
judgment it is presumed to be supported by facts 
known to the legislature unless facts judicially 
known or proved precluded that possibility." Id. 
at 517. 
The Legislature was not required to articulate its 
basis for enacting the measure or punishing an offender. 
However, the appellant went to great length on pages 
thirty through thirty-two of his brief to specify the Utah 
State Legislature's basis for this statutory measure. It 
is readily apparent that the statute in question was de-
signed to promote public safety by protecting members 
of the traveling public from those who, while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor, attempt to operate an 
automobile on the highways of this State. This interest 
is sufficiently strong to justify regulation of the conduct 
under the police power of the State. See Syrmot v. State, 
515 P. 2d 1154 (Okl. Cr. 1973). 
The respondent then raises the Bell case which should 
be properly named and cited as Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 
535, 91 S. Ct. 1586, 29 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1971). Although 
Bell, supra, unlike the case at hand, is a driver's license 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
revocation case, appellant fully concurs with the holding 
and reasoning of the court: 
"(Drivers) Licenses are not to be taken 
away without that procedural due process re-
quired by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . The 
hearing required by the Due Process Clause must 
be 'meaningful,' and 'appropriate to the nature of 
the case/ " 91 S. Ct. at 1589 and 1591. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.2, supra, indicates that no state 
action will be directed against an individual who violates 
the statute until the offender is convicted of a violation 
of the above section. Therefore, before respondent is sub-
ject to imprisonment and/or a fine under this section he 
must be convicted by a court of law wherein meaningful 
and appropriate due process of law will be administered 
by a court of law. Appellant is unable to follow respon-
dent's reasoning and conclusion when he alleges that a 
conviction in a court of law as required by Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44.2, supra, will not provide respondent with 
full and complete due process of law. 
Respondent then cites Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 
441, 93 S. Ct. 2230, 37 L. Ed. 2d 63, No. 72-493 (1973), 
which deals with the constitutionality of a Connecticut 
statute under which nonresidents of the state are perma-
nently and irrebuttably classified as nonresidents for the 
purpose of determining their tuition and fees at state 
institutions of higher education. Respondent concludes 
that permanent and irrebuttable conclusions are not 
favored under the due process clause. 
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The appellant recognizes Vlcmdis, supra, as articu-
lating a general rule. However, it should be noted that 
residency cases for determining tuition are easily dis-
tinguishable from driving under the influence of alcohol 
cases. The later is criminal in nature and is a strict lia-
bility offense (unless this court concludes that Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-2-101 (Supp. 1973), is applicable). The public 
interest to reduce the carnage and slaughter from alcohol 
related accidents on our public highways and in turn, 
increase highway safety is much greater than is the public 
interest as it relates to nonresident tuition problems. 
Finally, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.2, supa, is not a pre-
sumption situation like Vlandis, supra. The legislators did 
not utilize the term "presumption" or any similar phrase 
when drafting the enactment in question. The above 
statute simply makes blood alcohol concentration an ele-
ment of the offense. See State v. Rucker, 297 A. 2d 400 
(Del Super. 1972), and State v. Abbott, 514 P. 2d 355 
(Or. App. 1973). 
There is available case law concerning similar stat-
utes which uphold the validity of a strict liability offense 
in a driving under the influence of alcohol situation. In 
Coxe v. State, 281 A. 2d 606 (Del. Supr. 1971), the Dela-
ware Supreme Court affirmed the appropriateness of the 
.10% blood alcohol standard as well as the strict liability 
designation. The court held that under the Delaware 
statute, which is very similar to the Utah enactment of 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.2, supra: 
". . . that only two elements need be found 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
for guilt: (1) operation of the vehicles, with (2) 
the prohibited blood alcohol concentration . . . 
Its (the statute's) effect is to forbid any person 
to operate a motor vehicle if his blood contains 
.1 of one percent alcohol. It represents a legis-
lative determination that such quantity of alco-
hol has sufficient adverse effect upon any per-
son to make his driving a definite hazard to him-
self and others. We cannot say that this de-
termination is unfounded or contrary to the 
facts; a number of studies and many statistics 
have recently been published by experts in this 
field which support this conclusion." Id. at 607. 
In State v. Rucker, 297 A. 2d 400 (Del. Super, 1972), 
the Delaware Superior Court reversed a lower court dis-
missal of a driving under the influence charge and held 
that a 0.104% reading of blood alcohol by weight was 
sufficient for a conviction. The court reaffirmed the con-
stitutionality and validity of the statute and held as 
follows: 
"The statute does not set up a presumption. 
It simply makes a blood alcohol concentration of 
0.100%, or more, as shown by specified types of 
tests, an element of the offense. If one has that 
concentration while driving, as determined by 
the test specified in the statute and if that test 
was administered within 4 hours after the alleged 
offense, (the statute) directs that such person 
'shall be guilty.'" Id. at 402. 
Finally, in State v. Abbott, 514 P. 2d 355 (Or. App. 
1973), the Court of Appeals of Oregon reversed a lower 
court dismissal of a prosecution for driving with .15% or 
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more of blood alcohol. Oregon, like Utah, has a strict 
liability driving under the influence statute. However, 
the Oregon law requires a .15 percent blood alcohol con-
tent to satisfy the elements of the crime. 
"While common sense indicates that it is 
unlikely that a person with a .15 percent or more 
blood alcohol is unintoxicated, yet, it is entirely 
possible that he may physically conduct him-
self in such a manner that he may appear to be 
free of all or most of the usual indicia of intoxi-
cation. Thus, there would be reason under such 
evidence to find him not guilty of a DUIL 
charge. Under the state's police power, it is not 
unreasonable that the legislature should never-
theless make it illegal for all people to drive who 
have such a concentration of alcohol in their 
blood. We see no conclusive presumption of in-
toxication in such a prohibition because the 
question is not whether they are intoxicated, but 
whether they have .15 per cent or more of alco-
hol in their blood/' Id. at 357. 
It should further be noted that the passage of a strict 
liability driving under the influence offense which is based 
on blood alcohol content levels, represents a trend among 
state legislatures. The Constitutionality of California's 
Under-the-Influence-of-Alcohol Presumption, 45 So. Calif. 
L. Rev. 955 (1972), was published a mere two years ago. 
At the time the above article went to press, the author 
knew of only one state that had a strict liability driving 
under the influence of alcohol statute. 
"Nebraska alone makes a 0.10 blood alcohol 
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percentage itself an element of the crime instead 
of raising an under-the-influence presumption on 
proof of that percentage/' Id. at 959. 
In a period of less than two years the number of 
strict liability driving under the influence states has in-
creased from one to eight. They are as follows: 
(1) Del. Cod. Ann. tit. 21 § 2176(a) (Cum. Supp. 
1970). 
(2) Minn. Stat. Ann. § 169.121 (Cum. Supp. 1973). 
(3) Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-727, 39-727.03 (Cum. 
Supp. 1971). 
(4) McKinney's Consol. Laws of N. Y. Veh. & Traf. 
§ 1192 (McKinney 1973). 
(5) Ore. Rev. Stat. § 483.999 (Supp. 1973). 
(6) S. D. Code § 32-23-1 (Supp. 1973). 
(7) Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.2 (Supp. 1973). 
(8) Vt. Stats. Ann. tit. 23 § 1201 (Cum. Supp. 
1973). 
Respondent further contends that his right to due 
process is violated because a driver is unable to determine 
his blood alcohol content prior to the instant when he 
is apprehended by a law enforcement official and a scien-
tific test is administered. The argument appears to be 
novel with the respondent. He cites no case or statutory 
law to bolster the veracity of his argument. 
This assertion is likewise without merit. There is 
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no unconstitutional vagueness or ambiguity in the statute 
in question. Points IV and V of appellant's brief specific-
ally address and refute respondent's argument. In addi-
tion, the Utah Alcohol Safety Action Program, distributed 
through state liquor stores, 50,000 Blood Alcohol Calcu-
lators and 120,000 Blood Alcohol Wallet Cards during 
1973 and 1974. See Appendix No. 1. The Calculators and 
Cards indicate an individual's blood alcohol content in 
light of a person's weight, the number of drinks, the type 
of beverage, and the time period in which the alcohol 
was consumed. It is clearly evident that there are satis-
factory means available to put drinkers on notice as to 
when their alcoholic consumption exceeds the statutory 
limits for safe and lawful driving. 
Respondent further argues "that alcohol effects (sic) 
different people in different ways under different circum-
stances." Appellant partially agrees with respondent's 
initial premise. Point V (pages 29 and 30) of appellant's 
brief indicates the preeminent medicolegal authorities 
agree that in the range of .04% and .05% blood alcohol 
concentration levels, the driving ability of some but not 
all individuals will be definitely impaired The above 
authorities also agree "as blood alcohol concentration in-
creases, a progressively higher proportion of such indi-
viduals are so affected, until at a blood alcohol concen-
tration of .10% all individuals are definitely impaired." 
Point V (pages 29 and 30) appellant's brief. The evi-
dence compiled by the State Department of Public Safety 
and considered by the Utah State Legislature also indi-
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cates a blood alcohol content of .05% will affect the 
judgment and decision time of most but not all drivers. 
However, "when the blood alcohol content reaches the 
.10 percent level, all physical and mental functions of all 
drivers are adversely affected." Point V (page 31) ap-
pellant's brief. 
In People v. Laehman, 23 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 100 Cal. 
Rptr. 710 (1972), the defendant was convicted of the 
felony of drunk driving on the basis of the accused's blood 
alcohol concentration level which exoeeeded the 0.1% 
standard. The court held that the statutory blood alcohol 
concentration level was: 
" . . . not based on speculation but is founded 
on the long-recognized and scientifically estab-
lished relationship between blood alcohol level 
and degree of concentration. At bench the chem-
ist, an experienced researcher in the significance 
of alcohol readings, testified that 'an individual 
with a blood alcohol percentage falling with (in) 
this range (from .10 to .15 per cent blood alco-
hol) will be probably under the influence of alco-
hol, for it is within this range, if not in the pre-
vious .05 to .10 range, that all persons will come 
under the influence of alcohol . . .' 
"There exists sufficient rational connection 
in experience between the preliminary fact 
proved and the ultimate fact presumed to sat-
isfy the requirement of due process of law." Id. 
at 712. 
Respondent admits (R. 1) that "the results of a 
blood alcohol test showing plaintiff's (respondent's) blood 
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alcohol taken shortly after his driving was .012 (percent) 
thus in violation of the recently enacted code." The very 
high blood alcohol concentration level possessed by the 
respondent at the time of his arrest makes the aforemen-
tioned argument untenable. It is evident that the re-
spondent exceeded the strict liability level of Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44.2, supra, by .02 percent blood alcohol con-
tent. The argument espoused by the respondent may 
have been somewhat more applicable had his blood alcohol 
level been much lower and within the aforementioned dis-
puted levels. 
Respondent without citing any statutory or case law 
authority asserts that he will be denied equal protection 
of the laws because Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.2, supra, 
establishes an arbitrary class which denies the respon-
dent a basic right of travel. 
It is a well established rule that appellate courts will 
not consider assertions contained in a party's brief which 
are not supported by argument or citations of authority. 
An appellate court is not required to search the books 
for authority to support points raised by the respondent. 
See Williams v. State, 88 Nev. 164, 494 P. 2d 960 (1972); 
Kennedy v. State, 470 P. 2d 372 (Wyo. Supr.), reh. den., 
474 P. 2d 127 (Wyo. Supr.), cert, den., 401 U. S. 939, 91 
S. Ct. 933, 28 L. Ed. 218 (1970); State v. Anstine, 91 
Idaho 169, 418 P. 2d 210 (1966); State v. Lopez, 46 N. M. 
463, 131 P. 2d 273 (1942). The Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah has recognized an exception to this rule in 
State v. Davenport, 30 Utah 2d 298, 517 P. 2d 544 (1973). 
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However, the exception is limited to jurisdictional ques-
tions. Respondent's argument is not jurisdictional in 
nature and must therefore satisfy the general rule. 
Appellant is further unable to comprehend how Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44.2, supra, will deny respondent of his 
right to travel or equal protection of the laws. As one 
reviews Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.2, supra, it is obvious 
that it is void of provisions which would allow the state 
to revoke respondent's driver's license. The statute in 
question merely provides for a prison sentence and/or 
fine for one convicted in a court of law for its violation. 
The concept of equal progtection of the laws was 
reviewed in Railway Express Agency v. People of State 
of New York, 336 U. S. 106, 69 S. Ct. 463, 93 L. Ed. 533 
(1949). The court held that the question of equal pro-
tection was to be answered by practical consideration 
based on experience, such as whether the classification 
has a sufficient relation to the purpose for which it was 
enacted. A further case law requirement of equal pro-
tection was articulated in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. 
Resweber, 329 U. S. 459, 67 S. Ct. 374, 91 L. Ed. 422 
(1947). The court held that so long as the law applies to 
all alike, the requirements of equal protection are met. 
See also Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U. S. 357, 92 S. Ct. 479, 30 
L. Ed. 2d 502 (1971). 
A comparison of the case at hand with the previously 
mentioned legal standard indicates that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44.2, supra, does not violate the equal protection 
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clause. Point V of appellant's brief demonstrates that 
the statutory blood alcohol concentration classification 
has a close relation to the purpose for which it was 
enacted. It is readily apparent that the statute in ques-
tion was designed to promote public safety by protecting 
members of the traveling public from those who while un-
der the influence of intoxicating liquor attempt to operate 
an automobile on the highways of this State. The pro-
hibited standard for blood alcohol concentration was stat-
utorily set at 0.10 percent. The above standard was based 
on the experience of leading scientific, medical, and legal 
authorities in the area of alcohol and traffic safety. See 
People v. Jackman, 23 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 100 Cal. Rptr. 
710 (1972). The Utah State Legislature adopted the 0.10 
percent standard as a police power measure which was 
enacted to apply to all parties who utilize the State high-
ways. 
Courts that have considered contentions that stat-
utes similar to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.2, supra, are 
violations of the equal protection clause, have found them 
wanting. In People v. Berner, 28 Cal. App. 392, 82 P. 2d 
617 (1938), the defendant contended that a statute which 
prohibited an individual from driving while under the in-
fluence of an intoxicating drug was unconstitutional for 
the reason that it deprived the defendant of equal pro-
tection of the law. The court held that defendant's con-
tention was simply without merit. See also People v. 
Kimbley, 189 Cal. App. 2d 300, 11 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1961). 
State v. Sanchez, 110 Ariz. 214, 516 P. 2d 1226 (1973), 
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similarly held that punishing an indivdual for a driving 
under the influence of alcohol conviction is not a violation 
of equal protection: 
"It is obvious from this statute that a class 
of persons is created which is subject to severe 
prosecution, a felony, if they should drive while 
intoxicated. We do not, however, believe that 
the class is arbitrarily or unreasonably defined, 
and we believe the State has a valid and con-
tinuing interest in attempting to bar from the 
public highways those people in a rationally de-
fined class whose driving habits have merited 
the attention from the State that the defendant 
and others similarly classified require . . • by 
applying (the Equal Protection) clause, this 
court has consistently recognized that the Four-
teenth Amendment does not deny to States the 
power to treat different classes of persons in 
different ways. The Equal Protection Clause of 
that amendment does, however, deny to States 
the power to legislate that different treatment 
be accorded to persons placed by a statute into 
different classes on the basis of criteria wholly 
unrelated to the objective of that statute." Id. 
at 1229 and 1230. 
Respondent contends that his constitutional right 
to travel will be abridged by Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.2, 
supra. The issue therefore appears to be whether the 
above statutory prohibition allows the state to punish 
an offender who violates the driving under the influence 
statute and whether such prohibition is within the police 
power of the state. 
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In Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U. S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867), 
the right of a citizen to travel was characterized variously 
as protected by the commerce clause, the privileges and 
immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, and the 
implied constitutional guarantee to go to the seat of gov-
ernment. However, the right to travel, like other rights, 
is not absolute. In California v. Thompson, 313 U. S. 109, 
61 S. Ct. 930, 85 L. Ed. 1219 (1941), the United States 
Supreme Court held that states are not wholly precluded 
from exercising their police power in matters of local 
concern even though they may affect interstate com-
merce. The above holding was further defined to specific-
ally include highway and safety regulation in H. P. Hood 
& Sons v. DuMond, 336 U. S. 525, 69 S. Ct. 657, 93 L. 
Ed. 865 (1948): 
"It (prior case law) recognized, as we do, 
broad power in the state to protect, inhabitants 
against perils to health, safety, fraudulent trad-
ers, and highway hazards, even by use of mea-
sures which bear adversely upon interstate com-
merce." (Emphasis added.) 69 S. Ct. at 662. 
It should also be noted that the argument may not 
be a bona fide "right to travel" issue as respondent is 
free to travel anywhere within the United States. Unless 
respondent's license is revoked under other sections of 
the Utah Code, he is free to travel and operate a motor 
vehicle. In any event, respondent may travel extensively 
and as often as he wishes by airplane, train, boat, bus, 
etc., without government interference. 
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POINT III. 
ALTHOUGH THE QUESTION OF THE RE-
VOCATION OF RESPONDENT'S DRIVER'S 
LICENSE IS NOT BEFORE THIS COURT 
AT THIS TIME, IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE 
UTAH STATUTORY REVOCATION PROVI-
SIONS SATISFY CONSTITUTIONAL STAN-
DARDS. 
The lower court limited its ruling of "void for vague-
ness'' to the single statute of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.2, 
supra, which it declared to be unconstitutional. The lower 
court specifically rejected respondent's motions and or-
ders to include Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-18, supra, in this 
declaratory judgment proceeding. However, in the event 
that the Utah State Supreme Court considers the issues 
surrounding Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-18 (a) (3) (Supp. 
1973), and finds them to be appropriate for review, it is 
the contention of appellant that the aforementioned stat-
ute is constitutional on its face and as applied to the 
respondent. The text of Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-18 (a) (3), 
supra, is as follows: 
"Except as hereinafter provided, the depart-
ment shall forthwith revoke the license of any 
person upon receiving a record of the conviction 
of such person of any of the following crimes: 
. . . (3) Driving or being in actual physical con-
trol of a vehicle with a blood alcohol content of 
.10% or higher." 
Appellant contends that the revocation of his driver's 
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license will deny him of his constitutional right to travel. 
The case law indicates that there is no merit to respon-
dent's contention. In Agee v. Kansas Highway Com'n 
Motor Vehicle Dept., 198 Kan. 1973, 422 P. 2d 949 (1967), 
the court held as follows: 
"It is established law that the right to oper-
ate a motor vehicle upon public streets and high-
ways is not a natural right, but a privilege, sub-
ject to reasonable regulation in the public in-
terest. Being a privilege, the right of operation 
is subject to suspension when the public interest 
and welfare reasonably requires." Id. at 955. 
A similar conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court 
of North Dakota in State v. Harm, 200 N. W. 2d 387 
(N. D. 1972), as follows: 
"Permission to operate a motor vehicle upon 
the public highways is not a civil right nor is the 
license to do so a contract or property right in 
a constitutional sense, but, rather, it is a mere 
license or privilege. Although the privilege might 
be a valuable one, nevertheless the license to 
drive may be revoked pursuant to the procedure 
and for violations of the conditions prescribed by 
the statute under which it is issued." Id. at 391. 
The United States Supreme Court similarly accepted the 
aforementioned principle in Bell v. Burson, supra. See 
also Aiken v. Malhy, Vt , 315 A. 2d 488 (1974). 
Respondent also cites hardship as a reason to support 
the alleged unconstitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 41-
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2-18, supra. The case law is emphatic in rejecting this 
argument as indicated by the holding of Lewis v. Okla-
homa Department of Pub. Safety, 506 P. 2d 1387 (OkL 
Supr. 1972). 
". . . whether or not the Commissioner's re-
vocation of appellee's driver's license worked a 
hardship on him was immaterial because hard-
ship constitutes no ground for challenging such 
an order." Id. at 1389. 
See also Agee v. Kansas Highway Com'n Motor Vehicle 
Dept., 198 Kan. 1973, 422 P. 2d 949 (1967). The principle 
was more recently reiterated in Commonwealth v. Futch, 
223 Pa. Super. 752, 300 A. 2d 92 (1973), as Mows: 
"Although there may be severe consequences 
inherent therein economic hardship or consider-
able inconvenience befalling a motor vehicle oper-
ator whose license has been suspended, is irrele-
vant in an examination of the propriety of the 
suspension." Id. at 94. 
If at the conclusion of the numerous statutory and 
judicial procedures it is necessary to revoke respondent's 
driver's license, it should be understood that such revoca-
tion is not a punishment. While respondent may realize 
that his ability to drive a motor vehicle within the State 
of Utah and neighboring states has been curtailed, the 
case law indicates that the police power is the important 
end to be satisfied. In State v. Scheffel, 82 Wash. 2d 872, 
514 P. 2d 1052 (1973), the court held as follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
"While recognizing in one context that it 
might be so interpreted, it has been almost uni-
versally held that the suspension or revocation 
of a driver's license is not penal in nature and is 
not intended as punishment, but is designed 
solely for the protection of the public in the use 
of the highways." Id. at 1057. 
The neighboring jurisdiction of Idaho accepted the 
aforementioned rule of law in State v. Parker, 81 Idaho 
51, 336 P. 2d 318 (1959): 
"The deprivation of the driving . . . privilege 
is for the protection of the public and is not done 
for the punishment of the individual convicted. 
Moreover, the revocation is not by the court in 
which the conviction occurs, but is by the com-
missioner of law enforcement, in pursuance of 
regulations and conditions imposed upon the ex-
ercise of the driving . . . privilege, under the police 
power of the state." Id. at 320. 
It is well established law that a motor vehicle oper-
ator's license is an important and valued privilege which 
may not be arbitrarily suspended or revoked. See Bell 
v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 91 S. Ct. 1586, 29 L. Ed. 2d 90 
(1971). The Supreme Court of Utah recognized the above 
principle in McAnerney v. State, 9 Utah 2d 191, 341 P. 
2d 212 (1959). The Colorado Court of Appeals in Cove 
v. Colorado Department of Revenue, 30 Colo. App. 185, 
501 P. 2d 479, 482 (1972), indicated that "an operator's 
license, once issued, is not to be revoked arbitrarily but 
only in the manner provided by law." 
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Utah statutory law as codified in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-2-18, supra, provides for a departmental driver's li-
cense revocation "of any person upon receiving a record 
of the conviction of such person . . . [d] riving or being in 
actual physical control of a vehicle with a blood alcohol 
content of .10% or higher." The interpretation of the 
above language is defined in Emmertson v. State Tax 
Commission, 93 Utah 219, 72 P. 2d 467 (1937), wherein 
the court sanctioned the revocation of a driver's license 
after one has been convicted and provided complete due 
process in a court of law. 
Several states have statutes similar to that of Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-2-18, supra. One such state is Texas. The 
Tevxas judiciary upheld the constitutionality of the man-
datory revocation statute in Hurley v. Texas Department 
of Public Safety, Tex , 505 S. W. 2d 700 (1974): 
"The rule appears to be well established that 
a final in-state conviction for driving while in-
toxicated results in an automatic driver's license 
suspension under (the statute) . . ." Id. at 701. 
The court in Slater v. State, 296 P. 2d 193 (Okl. Cr. 1956), 
arrived at the same conclusion: 
" (The statute) provides that a court of rec-
ord must, after final conviction, require motorists 
to surrender operator's or chauffer's license and 
forward them to Commissioner of Public Safety 
"From the above it appears t h a t . . . the man-
datory duty of the Commissioner of Public Safety 
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to revoke the driver's license of a person con-
victed of driving while drunk, or more properly 
'driving a motor vehicle while under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor or a narcotic drug/ " 
Id. at 198499. 
Even states with more permissive statutory revoca-
tion requirements are deemed to be constitutional. In 
Keller v. Paris, 207 N. W. 2d 239 (N. D. 1973), the court 
held as follows: 
"Applying that rule we conclude that (the 
statute) permits the commissioner to suspend 
a person's driver's license prior to conviction of 
an offense for which mandatory revocation of a 
license is required upon conviction, when the rec-
ords of the Commissioner or other evidence dis-
close to his satisfaction that the person accused 
of such an offense has committed it." Id. at 244. 
Although Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-18, supra, does not 
require a hearing before revocation, it appears that the 
suspension of the privilege of operating a motor vehicle 
requires a hearing to meet constitutional standards. See 
Bell v. Burson, supra. The Driver's License Division of 
the Department of Public Safety has fully complied with 
these hearing requirements. Before the Division revokes 
a driver's license, it must receive a record of conviction 
from a court of law. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-18(a), 
supra. In the lower court judicial proceedings, a driver 
who is charged with driving under the influence will be 
accorded complete due process which will be sufficient 
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to satisfy all constitutional standards. It is only after 
the accused has been convicted and provided with his 
constitutional rights that he is subject to the mandatory 
revocation requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-18, 
supra. There is no question but that the judicial proceed-
ings in a trial are sufficient to satisfy all constitutional 
requirements, including due process of law. After notice 
of conviction is sent to the Driver's License Division of 
the Department of Public Safety, the Division is justified 
in exercising their mandatory statutory duty of revoking 
one's driver's license with the assurance that the accused 
has been provided with complete due process of law. 
POINT IV. 
RESPONDENT MISREPRESENTED THE 
FACTS AND ISSUES OF THIS CASE BY 
INDICATING THAT APPELLANT FAILED 
TO READ RULE THIRTEEN OF THE FIRST 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF UTAH. 
Appellant continues to maintain, as previously articu-
lated in Point VI of appellant's brief, that "the lower 
court judge violated the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and also abused his discretion when he granted the relief 
prayed for by the plaintiff without a hearing and without 
a motion for summary judgment." Appellant further 
maintains that he read the First District Court's Rule 
13 entitled "Order Pertaining to Law and Motion." Re-
spondent, without offering facts in support of his allega-
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tion, raises the assumption that appellant failed to read 
the lower court's rules. Contrary to respondent's state-
ments, appellant was fully apprised of the language and 
content of the lower court's rules. 
Appellant stands by his original statement and argu-
ment with regard to the issues in question. The appellant 
after reading the disputed rules asserts that there is no 
question but that appellant has standing to argue the 
harshness and unfairness of the First District Court's 
Rules. Appellant submits that the aforementioned false 
statements contained in respondent's brief amount to a 
breach of professional courtesy. The court in Hays v. 
Walker, 90 Ind. 105 (1883), made some appropriate re-
marks for attorneys who engage in appellate litigation: 
"Counsel who abuse their adversaries in-
stead of arguing their causes do their clients no 
good and themselves no honor. In the present 
instance, the language of counsel is such as mer-
its severe censure and keen rebuke." Id. at 107. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant adopts his prior conclusion with the fol-
lowing additions. 
Points III and IV of respondent's brief were stricken 
from the trial court record and are therefore clearly in-
inappropriate issues for consideration by the Supreme 
Court. However, if the Supreme Court considers any or 
all of the aforementioned issues, it is well established 
that Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-44.2 and 41-2-18, supra, 
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satisfy constitutional standards and do not deny respon-
dent his constitutional rights. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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APPENDIX NO. 1 
NUMBER OF DRINKS WITHIN TWO HOURS 
• • • • • • • • I I 
ONE FOR THE ROAD ? 
Use this chart to estimate 
BAC % (blood alcohol content) 
Each drink on this chart consists 
of one ounce 86 proof liquor, four 
ounces wine or 12 ounces beer 
taken on an empty stomach. 
UiAP^ 
Utah Alcohol Safety Action Project 
2525 So. Main, #17 











































- DON'T DRIVE 
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APPENDIX NO. 1—Continued 
THE PROBLEM 
More than 150 lives 
plus millions of 
dollars are lost 
each year in alcohol-
related accidents 
in Utah. 
Most of these 
involve problem 
drinkers. 
WHAT WE'RE DOING 
We're getting better 
identification of 
problem drinkers. 
We're educating people 
about the problem. 
(We're Utah ASAP) 
We're getting better 
enforcement and court 
processing of drinking 
drivers. 
WHAT YOU CAN DO 
Stay below .05% BAC 
(blood alcohol content) 
or stay off the road. 
Talk a "had-too-many" 
friend out of driving. 
Get better informed 
by contacting The 
Utah Alcohol Safety 
Action Project. 
J 
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APPENDIX NO. 1—Continued 
KNOW YOUR LIMIT 
NUMBER OF DRINKS IN ONE HOUR 
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Subtract .01% for each hour of drinking • In Utah the legal BAC limit is 0.08% 
• At 0.08% your risk of crash is 6 times normal 
• At 0.15% it is 25 times normal. 
UTAH ALCOHOL SAFETY ACTION PROJECT 
2525 South Main, #17 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 • Phone 328-5161 
^ ^ J 












At night in Utah, 1 in 6 drivers has been 
drinking. 
Vz of all auto deaths are alcohol related. 
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